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AGADIR

treaty to refer disputed questions of interpretation to arbitration as provided by the Hague Convention of 1907.

The reception of the treaties in Germany was far more hostile than in France, and Lindequist, the Colonial Minister, resigned in disgust. The Pan-Germans were furious at the abandonment of territorial ambitions in Morocco, all the more since they believed Kiderlen to have shared their views. The Chancellor discussed the settlement with his usual moderation. "After the dust of the conflict has settled," he observed to the French Ambassador, "we shall both see the importance of the results obtained, and Europe will find peace therein. The situation has been cleared up. Doubtless Morocco was destined to pass more and more into your sphere of influence; but we differentiated between political influence (as recognized by us in 1909) and direct authority. Perhaps at Paris they confused these things, and hence arose friction, which will now disappear. You are the masters in Morocco.*'

When Cambon complained of the sending of the *Panther*, Bethmann recalled his grave warnings. "If you could go to Fez, we could go to Agadir." In the ensuing debates in the Reichstag he spoke to a highly critical audience. His statements were supplemented by an address by Kiderlen to the Budget Committee, in which, without consulting the British Government, he gave a detailed account of the critical interviews between Grey and Metternich.

Kiderlen's prestige stood lower at the end than at the beginning of the Agadir crisis, for it was generally felt that Caillaux had won the game. Morocco was French. If it be pleaded that in 1911, as in 1906, the officers on the bridge were in disagreement, he should have taken that factor into consideration before he set the ship on its perilous course. In

1906 Holstein was prepared to fight, while Bismarck and the Kaiser were not. Though he possessed an authority such as no Foreign Minister had exercised since the foundation of the German Empire, he was not a dictator. He was blamed by the moderates for leading the country to the verge of the abyss, and by the Pan-Germans for letting them down. His technique was at fault. Russia had yielded to threats in 1909, but in 1911 France, backed by England, stood firm. Moreover, there is a suspicion of ambiguity about his attitude. In public he always disclaimed territorial ambitions in Morocco. In private, according to Cohn, the Pan-German leader, he expressed sympathy with their demands and encouraged them to pursue their annexationist campaign. On July 1, Zimmermann.